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The primary purpose of this thesis is to find the impact of defense 
spending on the economy of underdeveloped countries. An attempt has also 
been made to discuss the views of different economists on the subject of 
war arid preparation for it. 
The problem of defense spending in underdeveloped countries is of 
grave concern because they are beset with many other economic problems such 
as raising the standard of living, eradication of poverty, spreading education, 
improving medical facilities and providing various other social services. 
Most of the economists also agree that defense spending is wasteful and its 
effect is detrimental to various sectors of the economy. Four hypotheses 
are tested, out of which two are accepted and two rejected. First, defense 
spending does not effect the growth of per capita income. Second, budget 
spending on defense is at the expense of various other social services 
such as health, education and welfare. Third, the domestic defense industry 
is too small to effect the manufacturing sector} and finally wars have a 
damaging effect on the economy of underdeveloped belligerent nations. 
The main sources of information are the United Nations Statistical Year¬ 
book, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics and World Bank’s, World Tables. 
Also a wide variety of secondary informations, books and magazines were used. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. THE PROBLEM 
The history of resolving differences by means of aggression is very 
old. Weapons have teen used since the first homo-hibills appeared on earth. 
The industry of weaponry has thrived due to the natural instinct of barba¬ 
rism found in human beings. The stockpiling of these weapons, however, 
accelerated after the two great wars of the twentieth century. These stock¬ 
piles do not call themselves warmongers. They rationalize their activities 
as a means of detering the threats to peace. In other words they are spend¬ 
ing on war tools to deter war! 
Can we, by spending heavily or scarcely on the tools of intimidation, 
reach the universal goal of peace and prosperity? 
There are differences of opinion, regarding the effectiveness of 
weapons, as a means of bringing peace and prosperity to the world. To the 
defense planners arms trade is the best way to champion peace, insure 
regional balance and deter external and internal aggression. To many people 
such spending is a waste of the taxpayer's money. To them it is a bad 
investment. Many also argue on the size of such spending. To them defense 
spending is a necessity, but only up to a certain level. In short, defense 
has been in discourse for a long time but most discussions have been re¬ 
stricted to developed countries. Very little has been said about its pros 
and cons in the underdeveloped world. 
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The arms race no longer falls outside the orbit of underdeveloped 
countries. In recent years many of the nations In the underdeveloped 
regions have been spending heavily on arms and ammunitions. Most of the 
oil rich nations are spending their newly available petro-doilars accumu¬ 
lating the best weapons made. The poor nations are not far behind their 
rich counterparts in this arm's race. At the same time, these nations are 
also striving hard to augment their standard of living, eradicate poverty 
and provide their children with a better future, At this juncture the 
potency of conventional economic tools for bringing prosperity in the under¬ 
developed world vis-a-vis massive defense spending can be questioned. 
This study intends to investigate the hypotheses that: 
(i) defense spending impedes growth of gross national 
product and per capita income, 
(ii) defense budget is ai the expanse of other social services, 
(iii) production of military goods diverts resources from 
the private manufacturing sector, 
(iv) war between two countries bas disastrous effects on the 
economy. 
latportanoc of the problem, 
The problem of the arms race, a supreme issue of our time, is very- 
complex, urgent and vital. It becomes a problem of immediate concern when 
applied to countries where the majority of the population lives ir abject 
poverty, is practically illiterate and badly nourished. Instead of spending 
on mitigation of these economic ills these countries buy arms and ammunition. 
The problems can be illustrated by trie preliminary facts published in 
Newsweek.3- Out of the top twenty purchasers of anus from the United States 
■*‘Alan J, Mayer and others (or, et al), “Anatomy of the Arms Trade," 
Newsweek, September 6, 19?6* pp. 39~^5« 
3 
during fiscal year 1976, fourteen belonged to the underdeveloped world, 
Saudi Arabia topped the list with arms purchases worth $2502.5 million, 
Pakistan ranked twentieth with $38.5 million worth of arms shopping. It 
should be realized at this point that all these purchases were made from 
the United States. Although the Soviet Union is the number two seller of 
weapons to the entire world (i.e. thirty percent to United States' forty 
percent), it outsells the United States in the Third World by a wide 
margin.2 The Soviet Union entered the market as an arms supplier to the 
developing countries relatively late — in mid fifties. Until then Soviet 
arms had been supplied only to European socialist countries and to China, 
North Korea and North Vietnam. Since the mid fifties the share of Soviet 
Unions' export of weapons to developing world has increased tremendously. 
In some countries there has been a spree of arms sales. One such example 
is Groat Britain, Britain has been the chief supplier of tanks to Iran, 
and as a result Iran's army now owns more British made tardes than the 
British army. 
India is today one of the poorest nations cf the world. Its per 
capita income is about $116 (19?^). Approximately sixty four percent of 
the population Is illiterate. Drought, disease and famine are common 
features in that country. Notwithstanding all these tribulations India 
has become the sixth country to develop the atomic bomb. India's action 
has thus paved the way for many of its underdevelope-d neighbours to embark 
on a similar program. 
The possession of sophisticated weapons and the use of them further 
protracts the problem. The war fought between India and Pakistan in 19$5r 
in which both nations used modern American weapons, not only increased the 
violence but also extended "what otherwise might have 'been a brief and 
X 0 t )* « 
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primitive skirmish."3 Also, in the recent civil war in Lebanon the war 
escalated due to the clandestine supply of arms from a dozen countries. 
Who can forget the use of these tools and their consequences in the Vietnam 
t 
war! 
Ihe author’s interest was generated when many reports of a similar 
nature appeared in different newspapers and magazines. In this thesis it is 
hoped that the economic consequences of defense spending by underdeveloped 
countries will be examined systematically and scientifically. 
After this brief introduction of the problems of defense spending and 
its importance, the views of different economists from the time of Adam 
Smith will be discussed. A division between classical and modem economists 
has been made. The purpose is to show how the changing importance of the 
problem has changed the views of economists. The classical economists 
discussed in chapter two include Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Robert 
Malthas, Among the modern economists, F. W, Hirst, Keynes, Emile Benoit, 
and Seymour Meiman are discussed, A brief reference has been given to 
economists who favoured defense spending. Among all these only Benoit has 
concentrated on the impact of defense on less developed nations. 
2, ORGANIZATION CF REMAINDER 
OF THESIS 
As mentioned above, the second chapter will dead with the views of 
economists of the past and present. As such this chapter will ta primarily 
historical. This chapter will enable the reader tc see how the views of 
different economists have changed with the passage of time. 
Chapter three will be an analytical chapter, It 'will be the nucleus 
of this thesis as it will endeavour to find out the factors in the supply 
and demand of arms and ammunition and their impact on economic growth and 
-•Tbid, t p. 41, 
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development. 
Chapter four will he the concluding chapter. This chapter Kill repeat 
the key points of the rest of the study. A brief reference will also be 
given to the questions that are left unanswered by this study. 
I 
CHAPTER II 
DEFENSE AND ECONOMISTS 
In the past» wars and preparations for wars were regarded as a deviation 
from normal times. War is still regarded as an abnormal time even though 
spending on war preparation has become a regular feature throughout the 
world. Therefore it is not surprising that we find a scanty literature cn 
this topic in the field of economics. In the past» economists viewed the 
clash of arms as "a social abberation» a moment of madness which imposes on 
them no necessity to relate its process to the corpus of economic theory, 
To them it has been "a fleeting interrupt;!on to otherwise pacific pirsuit 
p 
of economic prosperity," 
The armament spending now unfolds itself in the wake of World War II as 
another challenging problem. It never appeared to be a menacing problem 
until then. Until the 1930's the arms trade was carried out by private 
manufacturers. But after the World War, trading shifted from private 
manufacturers to national governments.^ The desire for world leadership* by 
the industrial nations paved the way for less developed countries to join the 
“John Clark, New Economics of National Defense (New York: Random House, 
1966), p. 3, 
2Ibid., p. 3. 
-'George Thayer, The War Business (Now York: Simon * Schuster, 1969), 
r\ *51 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRl) The Arms 
Trade with the third World (Now York? KaEaritJ.es Press, 1971), p. 17. 
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race. These industrial powers began their active attempts to gain influence 
on developing countries throughout the world by providing them with highly 
sophisticated weaponry. In the Middle East the Interest of these major 
powers was the oil wealth. In Latin America and Africa it was the rich 
natural resources. In South-East Asia their eyes were cast on the strategic 
defense bases to be used to their advantage in times of war.^ All these 
areas have been glutted with the supply of highly modem weapons. The 
unfortunate part of this supply of weapons is that they do not go unused. 
Since 19^5 there have been more than a hundred wars of different sizes, 
duration and intensities throughout the world. If one plots a graph of the 
volume of conventional armanents given away or sold, one would find that 
the upward curve would closely parallel a curve on the incidence of violence. 
More and more underdeveloped countries are increasing their arras purchases 
and expanding their military training arrangements with the major powers. 
All these events have deepened the interest of economists and as a 
result a great deal of research work is going on in this field. This chapter 
will present the thoughts of various economists from the time of Adam Smith. 
As such this chapter will be more historical than analytical. 
CLASSICAL ECONOMISTS 
Adam Smith: Adam Smith gave some thoughts to the problem of defense in 
the fifth book of his volume, The Wealth of Nations,^ He does not consider 
defense expenditure as totally un justified. To him a military force is 
necessary to protect a society. The size of a military force however depends 
upon the needs and types of society. In a hunter or sheperd society there is 
a private cost attached to a military force. The cost of military force is 
5Ibld.. p. 17. 
^Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and the Causes of Wealth of 
Nations, Edinburgh, 177& (New York: Random House Inc., 1937). 
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met by persons who work in these type of societies. 
In a technically advanced society which has a work force and division of 
labor, the cost cannot be met privately. "The moment that an artificer, a 
smith, a carpenter, or a weaver for example quits his workhouse, the sole 
source of his revenue is completely dried up. Nature does nothing for him, 
he does all for himself when he takes the field therefore, in defense of the 
public, as he has no revenue to maintain himself, he must necessarily be 
7 
maintained by the public," 
Then again the question of choice arises i.e, the type of labor force 
to be maintained. The answer to the question of choice is not decided by 
which is cheapest but by the type of force best suited to protect the 
society. Smith concluded that a standing army is the best suited militia 
since "it is only by means of a standing army, therefore that the civili¬ 
zation of any country can be perpetuated or even preserved for any 
Q 
considerable time." 
After deciding the type of force best suited, Smith writes about how 
to finance it. Due to the modernisation of weapons the cost of producing 
them lias increased tremendously so that only trie opulent can meet the cost. 
The cost of maintaining defense according to Smith should be met on the 
basis of the individual's ability to pay. But these poor who are living 
on subsistence wages should be exempted from paying at all. 
So, in all, Adam Smith favored a permanent standing army to be financed 
by those who are above the subsistence wage level, according to their 
abilities, 
David Ricardo; Ricardo was against war. He worked on a method by 
which the government could bs restrained from embarking on costly wars at 
7
Ibid., pp, 656-657, 
8
I>id„, p. 659. 
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public expense. He lived at a time when the war between England and France 
was going on. He closely observed the implications of war on the British 
economy. Ricardo discussed two aspects of war. One was the effect of war 
on trade and agriculture and the other was the means of financing it. 
War effects the normal commercial life. It forces movement of capital 
from one industrial occupation to the other. Due to specialization of some 
fixed capital the movement is not smooth. As a consequence it creates excess 
and idle capacity in some sectors, which is one of the wastes of productive 
capital. 
War creates a shortage of food supply to a country which is dependent 
on food imports. To meet the domestic demand the farming sector has to 
expand rapidly to raise its output. This causes disruption .in the economy 
which prevails even when the war is over. During the war capital moves into 
agriculture to raise the output. The agriculture sector expands to the 
extent that It becomes too large when the war is over. The. country dees 
not become self sufficient in agriculture because it has a comparative 
advantage to trade for food with its manufactured goods. 
The excess capacity in agriculture disrupts the whole economy. To 
eliminate this excess capacity the government has to impose import re¬ 
strictions, This violates Ricardo’s principles of free trade. But this 
restriction is just a temporary phenomena which is necessary in the interest 
of the country. 
Another contribution of Ricardo to economics is that of the theory of 
rent. The work was prompted by the debate on the influence of war on agri¬ 
culture. Food shortage push food prices up and this induces farmers to cul¬ 
tivate poorer quality land. The fact, that the farmer gets a high return on 
cultivating poorer quality of .hand raises the rents of the more fertile land. 
10 
Ricardo's main contribution however was about financing the war. His 
main effort was to restrain the government from getting involved in unnec¬ 
essary wars. Wars could be financed in two ways — by loan or by taxes. 
Financing by loan shifts the burden of the cost to the future. Ricardo 
believed that the imposition of taxes is the best way to finance war. 
Taxes make the government "face the population immediately in Parliament. 
If the war is unwanted the members of the parliament could vote against it. 
But Ricardo's plan had many practical difficulties. First of all it is 
very difficult to organize a public debate at such a time. Secondly a tax¬ 
payer may not be able to decide on such a wide issue and may give preference 
to private interest over national interest, and finally, public diplomacy 
may also result in embarrassing the allies. 
Robert Malthus: Robert Thomas Maithus is well known for his views on 
population. His theory about population is as follows: 
Population had a natural growth rate described by a geometrical 
progression, whereas the natural resources necessary to support 
the population grew at a rate similar to an arithmetic pro¬ 
gression. Without restraint, therefore, there would be a 
continued pressure on living standard, both in terms of room and 
output.10 
Malthus maintained that war is an inevitable check on population. It is 
the alternative to moral restraint. When moral restraint fails, war is im¬ 
posed as an inevitable law of nature. But war is a temporary check. He 
explained the phenomena by arguing that when the economy prospers, people 
become affluent. As a result they procreate recklessly — which is eventu¬ 
ally checked by disease, famine and wax. War brings back prosperity and 
encourages the people to procreate again. 
^Gavin Kennedy, The Economics of Defense (London: Faber & Faber, 1975)» 
P. 29. 
•*-QA Dictionary of Economics. 1976 ed., S, V, Malthus, Thomas Robert. 
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All this does not suggest that Malthus favored war as a means of bringing 
prosperity. The prosperity brought about by war is short term and allusive. 
The greater the economic gains from war, the more serious would be the 
distress in the peace that followed. 
MODERN ECONOMISTS 
The two great wars paved the way for economic ideas about defense. 
Most of the economists looked at the problem from the moral point of view. 
Until the First World War the military matters were discussed by military 
leaders only. But after the First World War when industries were getting 
momentum it was realized that an industrial system was indispensible for 
a military power. Before the Second World War many economists turned their 
attention to the problem of war and defense spending. In this section 
mostly the twentieth century economists will be studied. A brief reference 
will be given at the end to those economists who looked upon the positive 
side of this problem.* 
F. W. Hirst: Hirst, a little known figure, was the editor of the 
'Economist* published in London. In 1911 Hirst addressed the Manchester 
statistical society. He said that all the expenditures on the armies, 
navies and weapons of destruction was wasteful, but it was absolutely 
necessary 'until universal and perpetual peace was established. He also 
said that, 
Our expenditures must be sufficient to maintain the Empire, and 
to give us ample security against invasion. At the same time all 
excess and provocative expenditure should be avoided and suppressed. 
A real effort should be made to secure proportional limitation of 
armaments, and there should be a severe financial supervision to 
make sure that the taxpayer gets full value for his money. 
After the First World War Hirst made an all out attack on spending on 
war. He wrote that expenditure or, war exhausts the sources of national 
“■Kennedy, op. cit., pp. .u > 
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revenues, increases taxation and affects the trade and finance of the country. 
He emphasized that war is a fictitious stimulus to activity. War debts are 
12 
the most "mischievous form of unproductive debt." War debts are mis¬ 
chievous because they enable the nations to go on fighting until they are 
bankrupt. The public debt thus becomes a dead weight debt. After the war 
when the nation is in shambles the economic policies adopted add to the 
miseries. An all out effort is made to reduce spending and economize in 
every sphere. Yet by economizing, recovery is postponed because if the 
nations do not increase their spending how was prosperity to get going? 
John M, Keynes: The theories before Keynes were founded on an old 
generalization, the nineteenth century .French economist Jean Baptiste Say’s 
Law of Markets. Often summarized in the aphorism "Supply creates its own 
demand," the law affirmed the impossibility of general overproduction of 
goods or a general "glut." Equally impossible therefore was general un- 
13 
employment. But evidence showed that unemployment persisted Inspite of 
the theory. The orthodox views had to crumble in the face of evidence. 
The theory had to be changed and Keynes broke the circle -with his book, 
14 
The General Theory of Employment. Keynes showed that in a war-disrupted 
economy everything works below full employment level. Keynes first explains 
how at the end of war the economy sinks below full employment level and 
later on how the full employment level is to be achieved. 
When a war ends, military expenditures are cut down to economize at all 
levels. Due to this, thousands cf people are thrown out of work. These due 
to the loss of job, cut their consumption. This adds to cuts imposed by the 
12md., P. 36. 
^Quoted in Robert Lekachmaa, The Age of Keynes (New York* McGraw Hill, 
1975), P. 83. 
^Kennedy, op. cit,, p, 37 . 
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government. The aggregate demand curve shifts to the left. This leads to a 
loss of confidence among businessmen and they too cut their investment plans. 
Aggregate demand shifts further to the left and the economy shrinks below 
the full employment level. Then Keynes showed how pubile expenditure could 
close the gap between the currant level of output and the full employment 
level. Prosperity could be triggered due to an increase in aggregate demand 
for goods and service when the government implements some public expenditure 
program, "Increase in aggregate demand causes employers to invest in 
activity thus increasing aggregate demand in each successive round of 
expenditure until the full employment position is reached."^ 
Emile Benoitt Benoit, a Columbia University economist, made a statis¬ 
tical study to find out the relationship between defense spending and 
economic growth in underdeveloped countries. His initial hypothesis ’was » 
that defense spending impedes economic growth in developing countries. Ke 
took a sample of 44 countries from 1950 to 1965. To his surprise Benoit 
found the average 1950 to 1965 defense burdens, of these developing countries 
are positively and not inversely correlated with their growth rates i.e, the 
more they spend on defense in relation to the sise of their economies, the 
faster they grow and vice versa. It could not have occurred by accident 
16 
because the basic correlation was strong. The multiple regression however 
revealed that most of the strong positive correlations were due largely to 
the investment rate and the amount of foreign aid received. But even after 
making maximum allowance for the possible influence of these variables, the 
residual correlation between defense burden and economic growth remained 
positive. There was no evidence to chow that the growth rates .affected the 
defense burden. So he reached the conclusion that whether or not defense 
15 
Quoted in Kennedy op. clt», pp. 37-33, 
Benoit» Defense and Economic Growth gn Developing 
D* fi. Heath and Company*. 1971/».. PP, 70-7.1. 
Countries 
In¬ 
activities had had a favorable net effect on growth in the sample countries, 
they had certainly not had a bad effect. 
Benoit suggested the reason for this result is that in less developed 
countries only a small part of any income not spent on defense is put into 
highly productive investments. Most of this income goes into consumption 
and the rest in social investments. These social investments not only 
proved highly unproductive but were managed so poorly that they were operated 
at uneconomically high costs and hence contributed less to real growth. 
The study however also revealed that for the average country in the 
sample "every additional one percent of gross domestic product shifted to 
defense might tend to reduce the civilian growth rate by up to one fourth 
17 
of one percent per annum." But when the statistical analysis was conducted 
these adverse effects were fully offset by certain growth stimulating 
effects which the defense program also had, 
Benoit does not explore the policy implications but suggests some. He 
emphasizes a much closer coordination between defense planning and development 
planning. In this way the countries would be able to optimize the combined 
security growth payoffs. He also considers policies on matters such as pro¬ 
fessional standing army vs. a civilian army, the extent to which civilians 
are allowed to use facilities created primarily for military use and a 
number of similar matters decided on the basis of narrow military consider¬ 
ations. 
Seymour Melmani Seymour Melman, a contemporary economist, shows that 
the belief that a war economy produces prosperity is not true. He argues 
that the modern defense system of America has drained the industries of their 
initiative, their ability to produce profit and their competitive spirit, 
17 
Ibid., p. 21 
Melman basically talks about the parasitic nature of the military in¬ 
dustrial base. The managers in the civilian product firms strive to maximize 
profit and minimize costs. The latter is not true in the case of the military 
industrial, complex. Big contracts are arranged by negotiation with one 
selected supplier, so there is no competition involved. When the buyer 
I O 
(Pentagon, in case of United States) orders a product, it usually buys it. 
Even if the price goes up the buyer finds the money to pay for it. Under 
such conditions the managers of the military-industrial firm make no effort 
to minimize cost, because they know that if cost goes up, so will the price 
and thereby profit. Besides there are many other kinds of costs attached to 
a military-industrial complex. The administrative cost is usually higher 
than any civilian-industrial complex. Engineers are employed on a lavish 
scale. Division of labor into small details makes it difficult for the 
individual engineer to keep in view larger considerations of product 
19 
function. 
Melman then argues about the parasitic nature of the military industrial 
complex. 
"Military goods and services are economically parasitic. In a 
permanent war economy whole industries and regions that specialize 
in military economy are placed in a parasitic economic relation¬ 
ship to the civilian economy, from which they take their suste¬ 
nance and to which they contribute little or nothing."20 
The cost of the military system entails a large opportunity cost. Tom 
Riddell estimates the cost at $676 billion, including not only the direct 
military outlays but also the military assistance to client governments, 
interest on national debt and payments for victories which will endure for a 
18 
Seymour Melman, The Permanent War Economy (New York: Simon Schuster, 
1974), p. 34. 
19md.. pp. 39-40. 
20 




Melman contradicts many prevalent beliefs about the military economy. 
First of all the belief that military spending contributes to economic 
activity as much as does any other public spending, is not true. "Military 
spending does put money in circulation by taking tax dollars from the whole 
community and distributing them to military-serving parts. In return, the 
people of the military economy deliver goods and services which have no 
22 
economic utility to anyone." Secondly military spending helps employment 
only in the military sector. It also swells the gross national product but 
these calculations do not take into account the massive trade off by which 
the civilian part of national income is reduced by military spending. The 
war economy also reduces the productivity of capital and job growth in the 
civilian economy also suffers. The swelling of gross national product may 
or may not mean additional wealth for the nation, Melman clarifies 'the 
meaning of wealth as follows: 
By "wealth" I mean economically useful products — hence, 
useful for the level of living or for further production. 
Additions to GNP that consist of nonproductive growth add 
no wealth and even detract from wealth — as in the 
immense quantity of capital productivity that is foregone, ^ 
So according to Melman, the military sector erodes the economic compe¬ 
tence of a nation, disables the market system, brings inefficiency and reduces 
industrial productivity. 
However there are many economists who believe that expenditures in 
preparation for war might hasten economic growth and bring stability to -the 
economy, A passing reference would he given to some of these economists. 
^Quoted in Melman, p, 66. 
22 
Ibid,, pp. 128-129» 
23Ibld.. p3 132, 
17 
Locmer Sombert (1863-19^1) looked at the "constructive side of war,"^ 
He stressed that the efforts of governments to support war and their prepa¬ 
ration boosted industrial efficiency and productivity among the belligerents 
by encouraging the organization of large scale enterprise and introduction of 
standardization into the manufacturing process. 
There are other economists, who believe that the research and develop¬ 
ment programs sponsored by the armed forces provide great potential for the 
civilian economy, Fritz Sternberg states: 
"The military revolution of one time is moving forward parallel 
with the second industrial revolution, in fact it was the 
military revolution which originally launched the industrial 
revolution. The new factor which has produced the military 
revolution is at the same time a new source of energy. Atomic 
power is a factor which will in the upshot completely transform 
the life of the industrial notations and of those which so far 
have only just begun their development as industrial nations, ^ 
Michael Kidron, a British economist believed that since the capitalist 
economies face a permanent threat of over-production, what is needed to keep 
them from boiling over is some kind of economic activity that draws off in- 
vestible resources from competing capitalists and uses them in an unproductive 
way without adding to total consumption. The arms economy provides just this 
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kind of service. 
The purpose of -this chapter was to show how -file importance cf -the 
problem cf defense spending has changed and hew different economists have 
reacted, Most of the economists discussed in this chapter dealt with the 
problem in relation to industrlcally advanced countries. The classical 
economists did not look at the problem with, depth, Adam Smith restricted 
Oh. 
Quoted in Clark, op^eii,, p. 192. 
2‘j JF ritz Sternberg » The Military and Industrial Revolution of Ouxj limes 
(New York: Fredrick A, Praeger, 1959)* p. 13. 
^Michael Kidron, Western Capitalism Since The ’Jar (London? Peter Smith 
Publisher, Inc., 1970), p, 3. 
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himself to two basic question. Firstly what kind of army is necessary to 
protect the country, and secondly who would be the financial source to keep 
the army? He did not write anything about the implications of spending for 
defense purposes. Ricardo on the other hand wrote mainly about the effect 
of war on agriculture. He made efforts to restrain the government from 
getting involved in wars. ïhe best way to achieve this objective was through 
the imposition of taxes. Before a taxation bill becomes a law it is necessary 
to get the approval of the members of Parliament, If the war is unwanted, 
the bill cannot become a legislation, Robert Malthus also did not write 
anything at length about war. To him war was am inevitable law of nature. 
It checks population and is an alternative to moral restraint, 
Among the modem economists, Hirst criticized the spending on war. To 
him war is a fictitious stimulus to economic activity, Keynes mainly talked 
about pulling the economy, which works at a low ebb, by increasing public 
expenditures and thereby increasing aggregate demand. Benoit did statistical 
research and found that in developing countries defense spending and growth 
are positively correlated. Seymour Melman showed how the enormous and waste¬ 
ful investment in defense spending leads to stagnation of powerful economies. 
There are many economists like Sombart Stemburg and Kidron who locked 
at the positive aspect of war. Most of the important beliefs about the 
defense spending will be theorized and tested in the next chapter, Some 
statistical analysis will also be done to test the validity of the theories 
about defense spending. 
The basic difference between Benoit's analysis and this study is9 that 
the former takes into account, only the relationship between growth and 
defense spending while the latter study Investigates the relationship 
between.} 
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(a) defense spending and growth, 
(b) defense budget and other social services, 
(c) defense production and manufacturing sector, and, 
(d) effects of war on belligerent nations. 
Secondly Benoit has made an extensive use of regression analysis in his 
analysis while this study takes help of analysis of variance to test the 
hypotheses. 
CHAFER III 
DEFENSE AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 
Most of the economists discussed in the 3.ast chapter agreed to the idea 
that defense expenditure is a burden. Benoit's statistical analysis, however, 
resulted in the rejection of his hypothesis, that defense expenditure impedes 
economic growth. According to him there are many other factors working 
which offset the adverse effects of defense spending. But it is too super¬ 
ficial to dispense with the problem just by regarding it as a burden or an 
outright waste. It is therefore important to explore this subject 
thoroughly. President Dwight D. Eisenhower in one of his speech said, “The 
cost of one modem heavy bomber is this: a modem brick school in more than 
thirty cities, two electric power plants, each serving a town of 60,000 
populations; it is two fine fully equipped hospitals, it is some fifty miles 
of concrete highway,What President Eisenhower was talking was the 
opportunity cost of the modem bomber. 
In this chapter the impact of defense spending cn the economy of 
underdeveloped countries will be studied. But before that, an exposition of 
the factors that influence the demand for and supply of weapons will, be made* 
This will explain the reasons for the flow of arms in underdeveloped nations. 
After that a set of hypotheses will be made regarding the impact. These will 
be tested later on in the light of empirical evidence, 
•'-'The Chances For Peace'* an address reprinted in the Department of 
State Bulletin, April 2?, 1953» p. 600, 
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CHART 1 
SOURCE: SIPRI. The Arms Trade With the Third World (New York; Humanities 
Press, I97l) p.7 Chart 1.1 
TABLE 1 
THE SPREAD OF SUPERSONIC AND TRANSONIC AIRCRAFT TO 
THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES 











































































SOURCE: SIPRI. Ibid p.8 Table 1.1 
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1. FACTORS INFLUENCING TOE DEMAND 
FOR WEAPONS 
Over the past decade spending on weapons by underdeveloped nations has 
increased tremendously. Ibis trend can be seen from chart 1. 
From 1959 to 1969 the growth rate in major weapons has been ten percent 
a year. The chief suppliers have been the United States and the Soviet 
2 
Union. There was a slight downturn in the supply from i960 to 1963» tut 
sifter that the flow began rising again. During this time the quantity 
increased and the quality improved. With technological advancement 
3 
"sophisticated weapons" began flowing to the underdeveloped countries. 
Advanced technology brought about an increase in the cost. Eut high cost 
did not abate the demand for weapons and more and more underdeveloped nations 
began acquiring supersonic and transonic aircrafts. Table 1 gives a picture 
of -this trend. Many of these countries have been supplied with counter- 
insurgency (COIN) weapons. These are the less expensive weapons used mainly 
in guerilla warfare. Examples of COIN weapons are armed trainers, patrol 
boats, helicopters, and hovercrafts. 
There are many factors that influence the demand for weapons. The 
important factors that influence the demand for weapons are the following! 
(1) Military Heeds; 
To meet internal and external aggression some type of force is necessary. 
Therefore most cf the .nations of the world have some form of standing array. 
The demand for weapons will be greater in an area which is highly volatile 
and where a tense atmosphere prevails. For example, in 1969, the Middle 
Eastern area accounted for one-fourth 
Similarly during the last five years 
of the world's defense expenditures, 
of war in Vietnam, the inflow of weapons 
"SIFBI, op. Pit., pp, 8-9. 
ft. 
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accounted for 20 percent of the total major weapons imports to the third 
world.** 
(2) Nationalism: 
Nationalism is the watchword in most of the underdeveloped nations of 
the world. By affirming national identity divided groups are made united. 
This purpose is served hy the acquisition of arms. In most of these nations 
there are wide ethnic and class disparities. Due to these gulfs the danger 
of clashes Between different groups always exists. To avoid this danger the 
presence of a strong combating force becomes inevitable. 
Sometimes external conflicts are also the result of a clash between 
different nationalistic interests. For example in the Middle East the 
conflict between Israel and the Arab countries is one aspect of commitment 
to two different nationalisms. Appeal to nationalism in India and Pakistan 
lias resulted in three wars between them in the past. The growth of Hindu 
nationalism in India and Muslim nationalism in Pakistan has caused war cn 
all three occasions. 
(3) Role of Aimed Forces: 
In some countries the armed forces are the most important elements in 
their body politic. They are sometimes the ruling class. To preserve their 
sovereignty and to establish a firm place in the political arena of the 
country the hands of armed forces are strengthened. 
To ensure the loyalty of armed forces the provision cf arms and 
ammunition is necessary. In addition the armed forces personnel are 
lavishly paid for their services, This is clearly visible in countries such 
as Kuwait, Libya, and Algeria. For example, in 1965 Prime Minister Ben Bella 
of Algeria tried to reduce the power of the army but was eventually over¬ 
thrown and succeeded by a Military ruler. Since then Algeria has been one 
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of the largest purchasers of arms in that area. 
5 
(4) Financial Resources: 
Financial resources are also important determinants in the acquisition 
of weapons. The larger the resources, the greater would be the acquisition. 
Most of the Middle Eastern countries have acquired large amounts of 
sophisticated weapons through their petro-dollars. During the last decade 
the oil rich nations like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Libya, and Kuwait have 
acquired large quantities of weapons from the United States and the Soviet 
Union. According to the preliminary facts published by Newsweek, Saudi 
Arabia topped the list of arms purchases from the United States, followed 
by Iran. Iran's purchase was worth $1301.3 million. Even Pakistan, 
which is considered to be one of the poorest nations of the world, bought 
arms valued at more than 38 million dollars, financed largely by massive 
Arab aid.^ 
(5) Strategic Area: 
This is perhaps the most important factor in the acquisition of 
armaments. A country that is strategically important can acquire a 
large quantity of arms and ammunitions at a cheaper price. For 
example, the Far East and South Asia have been very Important to 
the two superpowers of the world, which are virtually the main suppliers. 
It is quite clear that the patterns of arms acquisition in these regions 
is imposed by the interest of the supplying countries. It is however 
not clear, whether the wars in the strategic areas increased the 
requirement for weapons which was met by superpowers or whether the 
interest of superpowers exacerbated the conflicts. In the Far 
East and South East region there has been a direct military presence, 
5Ibid., p. 49 
, op. cit., p. 40 
particularly that of the United States. Eighty percent of the arms in this 
area were supplied by the United States and the Soviet Union. 
2. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE SUPPLY 
OF WEAPONS 
The supply of weapons by different countries is governed by their 
policies. But generally speaking the following are the main factors: 
(l) World Leadership: 
In the contemporary world there are some countries which are relatively 
dominant while there are others which are dependent. According to the 
experts at SIPRI there are three ways by which the supply of weapons can 
meet this end,? 
(a) By supplying arms to local forces, those military tasks are 
performed, that are in the interest of the suppliers. All the. other 
interests that conflict with that of supplying countries are avoidedj 
(b) By supplying arms the recipients are made militarily dependent 
forever. By making them dependent the suppliers can then demand favors or 
threaten to withhold spares or further supplies if the recipients do not 
comply with their interests; 
(c) The supply of arms may provide an opportunity for influencing 
individuals in the military establishment. This function is more relevant 
in countries where the military plays an important role, This occurs when 
contacts are marie between the military officials of the two countries. 
These functions do not operate seperately. For most of -the time they 
overlap each other. Thus in the Far East the interests of the supplier 
countries was at stake. In. -the Middle East supply of arms has teen used to 
make the recipient countries dependent and then to buy favors. In Latin 
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America where the military plays an important role, the supply of arms can 
influence military establishments. Between seventy to eighty percent of 
United States exports of major weapons have gone to countries bordering the 
Soviet Union and Communist China. The size of arms has varied according to 
the type of threat. In the early post war period the supply was concentrated 
in Greece, Turkey, and Iran, In Greece the United States' interest was to 
prevent the socialists from coming into power. In Iran and Turkey the 
interest was to prevent Soviet expansion. President Truman asked Congress 
for aid to Greece and Turkey to "support free people who are resisting 
Q 
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures,MO In 
South East Asia the supply was aimed at preventing the communists from taking 
hold. Similarly, Soviet aid was also designed to enhance 'their interest. 
Soviet aid however has mostly been indirect. The reason was to avoid direct 
confrontation with the United States, 
The European military aid program has also been dictated by political 
and strategic interest. In 1955 the British government's White paper on the 
export of surplus material stated that, 
"'Hie general policy of Her Kajestys government on the sale of 
arms is primarily governed by political and strategic consider¬ 
ations: only when these have teen satisfied are economic 
considerations — i.e,, the contribution of arms sales to export 
earnings — taken into account."9 
(2) Industrial Pattern: 
Some developed countries have an advanced domestic defense industry. 
But the domestic demand for weapons is comparatively small. To maintain 
such an industry the export of weapons becomes very necessary. Sophisti¬ 
cated .weapons are produced end exported indiscriminately to any country that 
8 
'Quoted in William à. Brown and Beavers Opie, American Foreign Assistance, 
(Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1953) * p. 12*!-. 
* 
'Quoted 1» SIPPJ, 0£vjcit,, p-, 215- 
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can afford to pay for these. 
The anas supply policies of Britain and France are dominated by this 
pattern. Export of defense weapons is necessary because of the existence of 
substantial economies of scale. In these countries the demand is so low 
that the production of advanced equipment proves too costly. The pro¬ 
duction can be expanded only if a sufficient amount of exports takes place. 
The expansion of production spreads the cost over a larger number of units. 
It also increases the productive efficiency. Since particular types of units 
are produced in large quantity. This industry also serves as an effective 
employer of capital and labor. 
(3) Prohibitive Policy; 
The supply of weapons also depends on the supplier country's willing¬ 
ness to permit or prohibit certain kind of transactions including weapon 
sales or military aid. 
Some countries adhere to the restrictive policy. They apply the 
criterion that no arms should be supplied to a party to a conflict. 
According to the Hague Convention of 1907» neutral countries are prohibited 
from exporting arms to countries in conflict. Countries Like Sweden, 
Switzerland, and Japan apply the principle that no arms shall be supplied to 
countries where there is an immediate threat of war. 
Restrictive policies depend upon the share of the arms industry in the 
total output and export. When the arms industry has a large share in export 
the less likely 'the country is to have a restrictive policy. For example, in 
Belgium, ninety percent of the defense production is exported} and thus its 
export policy in terms of defense goods is on® of the least restrictive in 
the world, Sweden, on the other hand, has a very advanced defense sector 
with an effective restrictive policy, The production in the defense industry 
is carefully planned that the surplus capacity is minimised. 
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3. HYPOTHESES; DEFENSE SPENDING AND 
UNDERDEVELOPMENT 
In this section different hypotheses regarding the impact of defense 
spending on underdevelopment will be considered. The theoretical reasoning 
behind all these hypotheses will also be discussed. A test of all these 
hypotheses will be conducted in the light of empirical evidence. First, 
an outline of the various hypotheses will be given which will be elaborated 
later on. 
(a) Defense spending is detrimental to the economy and it impedes 
growth of gross national product and per capita income. 
(b) High defense budgets are necessarily directly at the expense of 
other social services such as welfare, health, and education. 
(c) Production of military goods is a diversion of resources from the 
manufacturing sector, 
(d) War between two countries releases far-reaching disastrous effects. 
Theoretical Reasonings; 
(a) Spending on defense activities generates those goods and services, 
which from an economic standpoint do not contribute to the productivity end 
standard of living of a country. This spending is usually financed through 
the civilian sector. In return the military sector supplies the civilian 
economy with goods and sendees that do not have any economic utility. 
There is an "absence of economic functional usefulness"'*-0 in almost any type 
of military spending. It cannot and does not replace the investment done on 
civilian productive equipment. Investment in civilian productive equipment 
produces fresh output every year, while the spending on military goods do not 
add.to productivity of capital because there is no further production.. So 
~°Melman, op_.__cit,, p. 62. 
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in short when money is spent on military technology not only the present 
economic use is foregone hut also the increased productivity through expansion 
of capital. 
To the developing countries economic growth is a major priority. 
Economic growth is an indicator of progress and development. Gross national 
product, which is the sum total of good and services produced by the residents 
of a country, is one measure of development. The immense quantity of capital 
productivity that is lost when investment is made in the military sector 
also effects the G.N.P. and per capita income. Additions to G.N.P, consist 
of non productive growth which does not add to wealth — it in fact detracts 
from wealth. 
(b) Hie cost of defense activities is very high. It is still rising 
and causes many financial problems. The effect is felt largely in countries 
that do not have the rich natural resources to finance the cost, Poll owing 
are the costs of some of the important modern weapons.^ 
A United States surface-to-air missile built by Raytheon Company 
has a range of 22 miles and costs 9=3 million dollars, A United States 
anti-sutznarjjtie destroyer built by Litton Industries, Inc., which has a speed 
of 30 Knots, has a price of $127 million. A C-130 Hercules which ser/es as 
a combat transport built by Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, having a cargo 
capacity of 21 tons, costs $5.1 million. A British Chieftain tank made by 
Vickers, Ltd., having a 120 millimeter high velocity gun has a price tag of 
$650,000. Table 2 shows the approximate cost of a missile system. Ihis 
missile system costs more than 700 million dollars for development, production 
and deployment of a force of 50 strategic missiles. 
11 •flewswesk, op, cit,,-pip, AO- 
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TABUS 2 
APPROXIMATE MISSILE SYSTEMS GOST ($MILLIONS) 









Propulsion $ 32 $ 48 $ 80 
Structure 16 24 40 
Guidance — 48 80 
Re-entry vehicle — — 40 
Ground serv3.ce equipment 40 , 60 100 
Test and test facilities 80 120 200 " 1 ■ ■ ' ' 
Total (approx,) $168 $300 $540 
Production (unit cost) 
Propellant — 0.01 0.05 
Vehicle 0.2 0,4 1.2 
Guidance — 0,1 0.1 
Re-entry body — — 0.1 
Total (approx.) 0.2 o.5 1.5 
.Deployment (unit cost) 0.1 0.1 0.4 
Total production and 
deployment (per unit) 0.2 0.6 1.9 
Total system (based on 100 
operational units) 200 360 730 
SOURCE’S John H, Hoagland and John B, _   
Arms Races, ed. Era!le Benoit (New Yorks 
1971)7 P. 141. 
eplet The Economics of Regional 
Columbia University Press, 
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In underdeveloped countries there are many other costs that are to 
be met before building a sophisticated defense sector. In these countries 
the private sector Is not very efficient, investment activities are limited 
and the decision-making process is slow. So the government has to perform a 
wide variety of functions. It has to maintain economic conditions conducive 
to full employment, provide social services such as an adequate educational 
system, decent medical facilities and an effective welfare system. Besides 
all these, the government has varied political responsibilities. Thus when 
the responsibilities of government increase, the cost also Increase, Spending 
on weapons is carried on at the expense of other activities such as education, 
medical, and welfare. The upsurge of spending on defense and on civilian 
activities increases taxes. As expenditure rises the deficit in 'the budget 
also increases. To reduce the deficit the government imposes taxes. But 
taxes cannot finance the entire expenditure so the Federal governments 
resort to borrowing from outside. This poses difficulties on the balance 
of payment situation. 
The spending on defense is in fact a diversion of resources into a 
nonproductive channel. There is a decrease in production which causes 
shortages of consumer goods and services. The supply curve shifts to the 
left, there by raising prices. But economists are not sure about the causes 
of inflation and it is not strictly true that inflation is caused by 
increase in defense spending. 
Another effect can be -that on the terms of trade. Most of the 
underdeveloped countries have a large agriculture sector. ’Their exports are 
also comprised of agricultural commodities. Due to the perishable nature of 
the agricultural commodities the terms of trade are usually against them. 
When these countries import expensive defense materials, their terms of 
trade deirioraie further, * All these financial problems decrease tho value 
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of the currency of underdeveloped nations in the foreign exchange market. 
(c) Opportunity cost is "the value of the alternatives or other oppor- 
12 
tunities which have to be foregone in order to achieve a particular thing." 
When money and resources are spent on purchasing arms and ammunitions or 
producing them domestically they are not available for spending on other 
items useful for the civilian economy. Thus the civilian goods that are 
foregone are the real cost of defense expenditures. By opting for sophisti¬ 
cated weapons many development projects are denied. These projects are land 
reforms, irrigation, population control and industrial development. They are 
more important to the developing world. 
The indigeneous production of defense materials has more serious 
problems. It extracts the highly skilled and qualified personnel from the 
civilian sector. In underdeveloped countries human beings who can provide 
technical and managerial leadership in economic progress are the scarcest 
and most valuable resource. When military programs are given the highest 
priority, 'the most talented technical and administrative personnel are 
inevitably absorbed into these programs. It is because of the fact that the 
operation and maintenance of modem military equipment demands skills based 
on prior education and training. 
Another problem in indigeneous production is that since the 
underdeveloped countries are less efficient in the organisation of such 
programs the production and development cost per unit tends to be far 




*“A dictionary of Economics, 6th ed., s.v. "Cost". 
-uioagland and Steeple, op. cltt., p. 140. 
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"As an example, let us assume a requirement for 100 supersonic 
fighter bombers about the size of French Mirage III, 
Purchased direct from an industrial country, and assuming a 
large production run, the aircraft with spares would cost 
about 1,5-2 million dollars per copy for a total outlay of 
150-200 million dollars for the force of 100 aircrafts, Hie 
purchaser would also have a relatively great assurance that 
the aircraft would perform to specifications. If the air¬ 
craft with the same characteristics were developed and 
produced indigeneously, the total cost would probably be 
nearer 500 million dollars with far less assurance of 
meeting specifications. Furthermore it would require three 
to four million engineering man-hours and a production and 
management force of at least 2,000 people. An aircraft 
factory of at least 500»000 square feet would probably also 
be needed in addition to required development and test 
facilities." 
The developing countries have a legal right to maintain a self- 
defense program. But the response to it should not be excessive, 
(d) Ihe carnage brought about by war is a well established fact. Wars 
not only cost money but also bring economic, social and personal perils. Hie 
belief that guns produce butter may be true in the case of developed 
industrial nations but it certainly is not true in the case of the under-*- 
developed world. War disrupts the economic activity to take place, affects 
the annual growth rate and the available food supplies, The destruction 
brought about in the agriculture sector causes decline in its productivity 
which leads to shortages and produces inflationary tendencies in the economy. 
Due to these inflationary tendencies the real income falls considerably which 
affects idie marginal rate of savings. Not only does the marginal rate of 
savings decline, but, so does its share in the gross national product. This 
also effects the rate of growth of investments, 
Hie balance of payments is also one of the major casualties in war. 
The potential exports are destroyed by war, the domestic demand exceeds the 
supply. To meet the demand the government imports the goods and services 
•that are in short supply, A lack of resources to finance these imports 
poses a serious problem fox the balance of payment situation* 
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There have been so many wars in the underdeveloped nations, that it 
would be impossible at this point to discuss the economic impact of each of 
them. While testing this hypothesis, only important wars will be considered. 
4. TESTING THE HYPOTHESES 
This section will be devoted to testing the statements made in the 
preceeding section. The test will be conducted in the light of statistical 
evidence obtained mainly from the United Nations Statistical Yearbooks. 
There will also be some use of statistics released by the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) quoted in different books. Many figures have also 
been taken from Gavin Kennedy's book The Military in the Third World, 
Hypothesis It 
Military expenditures are usually regarded as wasteful and an impediment 
to growth. Table 3 shows the growth of gross domestic product (GDP) ar.d the 
percentage of gross national product (GNP) allocated to defense try some of 
the underdeveloped countries during a given period of time. 
The relationship is tested statistically by the help of Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) Table. The countries are divided into three groups according 
to their allocation of defense spendings. They are labelled low, medium, and. 
high spenders. The figures in braces show the percentage of GNP allocated to 
defense. With the help of ANOVA table the test of significance is conducted. 
The purpose is to find out whether or not the difference in growth of gross 
domestic product is explained by differences in defense spending. Among the 
low spenders the average growth rate was 4,83 percent. The medium, spenders 
had an average growth rate of 5*4? percent while the high spenders had. an 
average of 5,68 percent. The overall average was 5.32 percent. The ANOVA 
test is done to find cut tee F-ratio which is the ratio between variation 
14, ’Gavin Kennedy* The Military in Third World {Latvians Duckworth, 
TABLE 3 
AVERAGE GROWTH OF THS GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (fo) AND THE PERCENTAGE 
OF AVERAGE CROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT ALLOCATED TO DEFENSE DURING 1960s 
IOW SPENDER a MEDIUM SPENDER b HIGH SPENDER C 
Defense Growth Defense Growth Defense 
Honduras .95 5.8 Argentina  2.91 3.2 Iran 9.36 
El Salvador .... 1.10 5.9 India ........... 3.39 5.2 Taiwan    10.93 
Uganda   1.57 3.5 Nigeria   4.07 6.1 Iraq. ........... 14.00 
T ‘Kvo & k i t e a i « o 9 « 2,10 4,3 Zaire   4.40 3.4 Egypt   23.30 
Tbursania   2,42 4.7 S. Korea ........ 4.95 9.2 N. Korea ....... 26.50 
2.46 4.8 Pakistan ........ 8.93 5.7 Israel ......... 27.40 
Group Average of Group Average of Group Average of 
Growth , 4.83 Growth   > 5.47 Growth  
Overall Average ., . 5.32 
a. Low spenders include countries that spend less that 25 percent of their 
GNP in defense, 
b. Medium spenders include countries that spend between 25 percent and 9 
percent of their GNP on defense. 
c. High spenders include countries that spend more than 9 percent of their 
GNP on defense, 
SOURCE: T, N, Bupuy and W» Blanchard, Aimanace of World Military Power, (New York: 
(Computed and rearranged). 










TABLE 3 Continued 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE 
Source of Variation 





of o F. Ratio 
Between Group 2.y± 2 1.17 
.21 
Within Group ana 12 5.60 
86.25 17 
Tatle valus at 9% confidence Interval » 3*68 
.21 4 3.68 
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within groups. If the computed F ratio is more than the table value in F 
distribution then we can say that there is an association between these two 
variables and this association is not out of error or chance. Upon conducting 
the test it was however found that the computed value at 99 percent and 95 
percent level of confidence was less than the table value. Thus we reject 
the hypothesis and conclude that the observed difference in growth rate is 
not due to different defense spending. Even by looking at the table one 
can safely say that military expenditures do not effect the growth rate in 
identical ways. For example, Taiwan, Israel, Iraq., and Egypt are the highest 
spenders in the military sector. All of them have defense allocations of 
more than 9 percent of their GNP, but their growth rates are quite different. 
Taiwan's military expenditure has been 10.93 percent of GNP while its growth 
rate has been about 10.3 percent, Honduras on the hand had about .95 percent 
of GNP spent on defense but had a growth rate of only 5.8 percent. Israel 
spents much more than any other country in the sample but had an equally 
high growth rate. Egypt on the other hand spends about 23.3 percent of GNP 
and had a growth rate of only 1.8 percent. 
In another ANOVA test conducted to find out the relationship between 
defense spending and per capita income similar conclusions were reached. Tne 
same sample was chosen to find out if the difference in per capita income 
is due to difference in defense spending or is it due to error or chance. 
It was found that the computed F Ratio was much smaller than the table 
value. In other words, the observed differences in per capita income was not 
due to different defense spendings. 
Conclusion: Tne statistical test does not suggest 'that defense allocations 
have affected either the growth of GDP or per capita income. Defense speeding 
might have affected seme countries adversely (or even all of them) but the 
TABLE 5 
AVERAGE MILITARY EXPENDITURE AS A PERCENT 
OP GNP AND CHANGES IN PER CAPITA GNP DURING 1960s 
LOW SPENDER & MEDIUM SPENDER 
b HIGH SPENDER c 
Income Income Income 
Defense Growth • Defense Growth Defense Growth 
Honduras .... .95 3.67 Argentina     2.91 8.38 Iran ......... 15.59 
EX Salvador . =.. 1.10 5.25 India     3.39 3.15 Taiwan ....... 8.68 
Uganda ... 1,57 2.13 Nigeria   5.07 7.55 Iraq   6.28 
Li oy v » * » «. c • « * ... 2,10 16.05 Zaira ........... 5.50 3.99 Egypt   5.43 
Tanzania , 7.52 S. Korea   5.95 8.69 N. Korea ..... 5.03 
Chile »  1.38 Pakistan ........ 8.93 2.38 Israel ....... 9.50 
Group Average 5.98 Group Average .,. . 5.67 Group Average 
Income Growth Income Growth Income Growth 
Overall Average . . 6.57 
a. Low spender include countries that spend, less than 2.5 percent of their 
GNP on defense 
b. Medium spender include countries that spend between 2.5 and 9 percent of 
their GNP on defense. 
c. High spender include countries that spend more than 9 percent of their 
GNP on defense, 
SOURCE$ Defense figures have been taken from World Military Almaace, op. cit,, and income growth from Yearbook 
of National Accounts Statistics, 1970-75,"'vôTIïïî    
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TABIS 4- —- Continued 
ANOVA TABLE 
Sum of Squared 




of <r 2 F-Ratio 
Between Groups 20.22 2 10.11 
Within Groups 255.26 15 17.01 
275.48 17 
« 
Table value at 95% C • I = 
.59 < 3.68 
3.68 
40 
présence of many other factors might have diluted its effect. For example, 
the population growth in some of the underdeveloped countries had been very 
high and any addition to development is swallowed by the ever increasing 
population force, 
Hypothesis II: 
In this section the financial aspect of defense spending is to be 
tested. Because of the lack of statistical information only one aspect of 
this hypothesis will be put to test viz,, that high defense budgets are 
necessarily directly at the expense of other civilian activities. 
The AHOVA test is conducted in this hypothesis also. In -this test, due 
to lack of data, the sample has been reduced to fifteen countries. These 
are different groups of countries which allocate their state budget differ¬ 
ently. The relationship is conducted between average defense expenditure , „ 
and social services expenditures as a percent of budget. (Social Services 
includes health and education). In this case it was found that the computed 
F-iiatio was higher than the table value. This means 'that the observed 
difference vras certainly due to different defense budget in different 
countries. This hypothesis is thus accepted and it can be concluded that 
defense budget is at the expense of other sectors in the state budget, 
A glance at table 5 shows that when less is spent on defense, there is 
more to spend on social services in the economy, 'fable 6 shows that, the 
allocation on defense out of the total budget is higher in countries that 
have been belligerent than in the non-belligerent countries. All the 
countries engaged in the Arab-Israel wars had an average of more than 20 
percent of the budget allocated to defense, Then sosie of the American 
TABLE 5 
AVERAGE MILITARY EXPENDITURE ON DEFENSE AND ON SOCIAL SERVICES 
AS A PERCENT OF STATE BUDGETS DURING 1960s 
LOW SPENDER a 
Social 
Defense Services 
Bangla Dash .. 6.00 13.02 
Tanzania ..... 9.70 25.37 
El Salvador... 10.57 49.50 
Chile  10.8? 28.63 
Honduras ..... 12.25 43.92 
Group Average 
Social Services 




Uganda .. 25.49 
Iran .... 24.48 
India ... 24.62 
S. Korea ... 22.42 22.30 
Brazil .. 6.81 
Group Average 
Social Services...... 
Overall Average ..... 




Libya  . 25.30 10.52 
Iraq       . 31.10 12.18 
Pakistan    . 31.72 1.59 
Egypt   . 45.09 25.83 
Israel   . 46.30 10.14 
Group Average 
Social Services . 
a. Low spender include countries that spend less that 15 percent of their 
Budget on defense. 
b. Medium spender include countries that spend between 15 percent and 25 
percent of their budget on defense. 
c. High spender include countries that spend more that 25 percent of their 
budget on defense. 
SOURCE* United States Statistical Yearbooks. New York» International Publishing Service. 1965» 1968, 
1972, 1975. (Calculated and rearranged). 
TABLE 5 — Continued 
ANOVA TABLE 
Source of Variation 
Sum of Squared 
Deviation 
Degrees of Estimate 
Freedom of cT ^ F-Ratio 
Between Groups 1008.80 2 504.4 
4.27 
Within Groups 1417.19 12 118.09 
2425.99 14 
Confidence Interval 




AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENTAGE ALLOCATION ON DEFENSE 
OUT OF STATE BUDGET 
WAR CONFRONTATION INSURGENCY 
SYRIA (62-69) w INDONESIA 
JORDAN (61-70) 46% MALAYASIA 
NIGERIA (67-69) 35% ARGENTINA 
EGYPT (58-71) 33% EQUADOR 
IRAQ (60-70) 30% CAMEROUN 
KOREA (60-70) 25.7% BOLIVIA 
PAKISTAN (60-69) 24.9% TANZANIA 
LEBANON (61-70) 21.2% 
ETHIOPIA (64-69) 20.9% 
INDIA (63-71) 20.7% 
EL SALVADOR (64-67) 10.3% 
HONDURAS (64-70) 9.3% 
(63-67) 31.3% BURMA (63-70) 33% 
( 1966) 16.0% COLUMBIA (65-71) 21.3% 
(63-69) 15.6% BRAZIL (64-?0) 17.0% 
(63-69) 15.3% THAILAND (61-71) 17.0% 
( 1964) 15.2% PERU (64-68) 16.9% 
(66-68) 14.8% SUDAN (62-69) 13.3% 
(63-70) 13.4% PHILU PINES (61-70) 10.7% 
GUATEMALA (63-69) 10. *0* 
CHILE (64-68) 9.6% 
SOURCE* United Nations Statistical Yearbook. 1970 New York* 
Publishing Service, United Nations, 1970, 
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"forward, defense areas''^ had a substantially high budget despite the fact 
that they receive large military assistance from the United States, 
The Latin American countries also allocated substantially. Although 
none of these countries experienced external hostilities after the Second 
World War (except for a brief skirmishes between Honduras and El Salvador),^ 
but their internal situation always remained turbulent. (.See table 6). 
Table 7 indicates the annual average expenditure on defense and welfare 
during the 1960's. Almost all the African countries had their share of 
welfare more than defense. In Middle Eastern countries it was otherwise. 
In Latin American countries except for Brasil and Argentina welfare 
expenditures had an edge over defense. 
Conclusion! This hypothesis is accepted that defense expenditure, in most 
of the underdeveloped nations was at the expense of other sectors. It 
certainly was taking a large bite of the budget pie, Two important con¬ 
clusions were reached in this section. First, the political situation'has 
a direct effect on the defense allocation. All those countries that had 
faced either war, confrontation, or insurgency had a substantial proportion 
of their budget allocated to defense; and second, defense was at the expense 
of other sectors. 
The United States "forward defense area" includes countries bordering 
Soviet Union and China, . They are South Korea, Lacs, Taiwan, the Fhillipines, 
Thailand, South Vietnam, Greece, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. SIPRI, op, clt,, 
pp. 21-22, 
^ There has been frequent border clashes between Honduras and El Sal¬ 
vador and in 1969 there was a so-called football war. During their tension 
days there was a football match between these two countries and a goal 
scored was disqualified by the umpire which resulted in dispute and later on 
the war erupted. See I), Rennie, "The Goal that Started a Mar", Sunday Times, 
London, May 3* 1970- 
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Hypothesis III 
îhere are two suspects to the problem of domestic arms production in the 
underdeveloped countries. Looking from the viewpoint of opportunity cost, 
the whole exercise looks wasteful. From smother point of view it helps 
in establishing the infrastructure for an industrial base. 
The domestic defense production in the underdeveloped countries has 
increased tremendously. Table 8 shows the domestic defense production in 
the underdeveloped countries. The main reason for doing so has been to 
reduce dependence on foreign suppliers, to avoid the political strings 
attached to arms imports and to ensure the availability of necessary spares 
in times of crisis. 
It is quite obvious that only those countries that have a larger 
manufacturing base can have a domestic defense industry. Eut not all 
manufacturing industries are necessary for defense production. There axe 
seven sub-categories of the United Nations manufacturing classification 
which can possibly contribute to the defense program. They are: 
(1) iron and steel, 
(2) non-ferrous metals, 
(3) nie tal products, net machinery, 
(k) machinery, non-electrical, 
(5) electrical machinery, 
(6) ship building and repairing, 
/ \ 17 
(7; motor vehicles. 
In table 9 the growth performance of the manufacturing and the potential 
defense capacity sector Is shown. In this table thirteen countries had 
defense industries. Only two were arms importers. Of the arms producers 
-j O 
"'Quoted in Gavin and Kennedy, op. cit., pp, 296-297. 
TABIE 7 
ANNUAL AVERAGE EXPENDITURE ON DEFENSE AND WELFARE 
COUNTRY YEARS DEFENSE WELFARE 
Malawi 1964-69 2.2 20.3 
Kenya 1964-70 5.1 15.6 
Nigeria 1961-66 5.2 25.6 
Uganda 1964-70 8.8 25.2 
Ethiopia 1964-69 20.9 17.3 
Israel 1964-70 25.8 15.3 
Egypt 1958-70 33.0 20.7 
Jordan 1964-70 46.0 10.7 
Costa Rica 1965-69 7.0 28.6 
Honduras 1956-70 9.1 22.4 
El Salvador 1964-70 10.3 24.0 
Argentina 1963-69 15.6 14.0 
Brazil 1964-70 17.0 7.1 
u'' 
SOURCE: Calculated from United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1971. op.cit 
TABLE 8 

























Argentina X X X X X X X X 
Brazil V .A X V X X X X X X 
Ei Salvador X 
India X X X X 1 X X X X X 
X A A 
Israel X X X X X X X X 
Mexico X X X X X 
Nigeria X 
Pakistan X X 
Taiwan X X X X 
Turkey X X X X 
SOURCE: SÏPRI, Tie Arms Trade with the third World, (New York: Humanities 
Press, 1971), ?. 725. 
nine countries had the potential defense sector growing faster than their 
manufacturing sector. But in any case since the potential defense sector is 
associated with and integrated into the metal and engineering sectors and 
there appears to be some positive associations between the expansion of 
both sectors, it does not seem that it extracts resources. 
Table 10 shows defense force as a percentage of labor force. With the 
exception of India and Nigeria, all the countries have more than three 
percent of their labor force in the defense sector. So the defense sector 
does extract a segment of labor force that is active but it is very insignifi 
cant. 
Conclusioni The conclusion reach in this section is that since defense 
sector is associated with manufacturing it serves as its complement. Secondly 
the amount of labor force working in the defense sector is highly insignifi¬ 
cant. 
Hypothesis IV» 
Due to the unavailability of statistical data only two wars will be 
considered. First, the Arab-Israel War and second the Indo-Bakistan war. 
In the former cases only Egypt and Israel will be considered while in the 
latter Pakistan and India are analysed. 
Arab-Israel War» Looking at the statistics in Table 11 it appears quite 
clearly that the war sent ripples across the entire Israeli economy. The 
growth rate fell down by ,1 percent. Changes in per capita income, consump¬ 
tion, output, employment, gross investment, net investment, employment, and 
diamond exports all showed negative trends. According to the Israeli Finance 
18 
Minister, the war cost $750 million dollars to Israel. 
l8 




ANNUAL AVERAGE RATES OF GROWTH OF MANUFACTURING OUTRJT 





CAPACITY SECTOR (/°) 
Taiwan 16.6 21.7 
S. Korea 18.2 19A 
Egypt 11.7 18.1 
Iran 11.7 12.2 
India 5.8 11.5 
Israel 11.3 10.6 
SI Salvador 11.5 8.2 
Honduras 11.9 17.9 
SOURCE: Gavin Kennedy, op, clt,, p, 300, table 6. (Extracted and rearranged) 
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TABLE 10 






(1) AS % 
OF (2) 
India 1,080,000 200,000,000 0.54 
Vietnam 1,055,000 18,000,000 5.86 
Taiwan 540,000 5,500,000 9.80 
Pakistan 672,000 21,100,000 3.18 
Egypt 634,000 9,000,000 4,82 
Israel 310,000 2,314,000 13.39 
Iran 531,000 10,000,000 5.31 
Nigeria 252,000 30,000,000 0,84 
SOURCE: Calculated from CBS NEWS Almanac, 1977. 
New Jersey» Hammond Almanac, Inc,, 1976, 
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The estimated cost to Egypt was about $500 to $600 million up to 19->9. 
The Israeli occupation of Sinai, cut off the main source of revenue i.e. 
Oil. It is estimated that oil production was $56 million a year. The war 
also damaged the Egyptian oil refineries. This inflicted a repoted $230 
million worth of damage. The international trade also suffered a setback and 
foreign debt increased to $4.3 billion in 1966.^ 
Indo-Pakistan Wax: The 1965 war broke the growth trends in Pakistan's 
economy. The rate of growth in investment for 1964-65 to 1968-69 was only 
four percent, which is just under $30 million. The investment and savings 
as a percent of GNP also fell. With the reduction in proportion of savings 
in GNP to 9.7 percent the marginal rate of savings also fell from 24 percent 
to 5.7 percent (see table 12). 
A bad harvest followed the war of 1965. Food shortages increased the 
prices, The prices of other commodities also increased. In short the 
economy was fully destroyed by the war. Table 13 shews the impact of war 
on the India economy. The war had a disastrous effect on the Indian economy 
as well, The growth in investment started sinking down. Savings also fell 
down from 14,24 percent to 11.87. The share of manufacturing declined. The 
deficit in the balance of payment widened and the rate of exchange also 
deteriorated« 
Conclusion: This hypothesis stands accepted that the conoray is damaged by 
the wars. 
■^The Economist, London, June 10f 1967. 
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TABLE 11 
AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN 
SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS OF ISRAEL FROM 1965 - 1969 
INDICATOR 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
GNP 8.4 1.5 1.4 14.2 12,0 
GNP per capita 4.8 -1.1 -1.8 11.0 8.0 
Private consumption 
per capita 4.6 0.5 -1.7 7.4 8.5 
Public consumption 10.5 8.3 26.8 13.4 10,0 
Output 9.9 1.4 -3.1 28,6 18.0 
Output per worker 8.3 3.4 2.4 11.9 6.0 
Gross investment -1.3 -14.8 -28.1 45.2 25. o 
Net investment -8.2 -25.3 -22.4 87.6 35.0 
Employment 3.0 -0.6 -4.2 9.0 11.0 
Diamond Export 11.6 25.1 -4.4 22.9 13.0 
Other industrial exports 12,7 14.3 9.1 26.1 17.0 
Wages 18.4 19.8 3.3 • 
0
 ! 
Cost of living index 7.7 8.0 1.6 2.1 





 1 1.3 16.3 
SOURCE* Quotes in Keunei 3y, op^ eii,, Table 1 and 2» pp. 231. 234 (data rearra 
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TABLE 12 
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS, PAKISTAN — 1954-69 
INDICATOR 1954-55 1964-65 1968-69 
% GNP in agriculture 56.1 48.1 45.4 
% GNP in manufacturing 8.0 11.5 11.8 
Investment/GNP (f) 9.2 18.8 13.3 
Savings/GNP (fa) 6.7 12.2 9.7 
Impcrts/GNP (fa) 7.1 11.1 6.2 
Exports/C-NP {%) 8.0 4.9 4.1 
Average increase 
industrial production 31.1 11.3 7.4 
SOURCE; J. J. Stern and W. P, Falcon, Growth and Development in Pakistan, 
1954-1969» Harvard, 1970, Tables II-ÎL. II-2t II-3, 11-^7 ÏI-5. 
II-6, II-7, IX-8, and III-3. (adjusted and combined). 
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TABUS 13 
PERFORMANCE INDICATOR, INDIA — 1964-68 
INDICATORS 1965 1966 1967 1968 
% of GNP in agriculture 41.57 43.92 47.27 43.93 
% of GNP in manufacturing 12.78 12,07 10.92 11.36 
Investment/GNP {%) 17.34 15.83 14.33 13.90 
Savings/GNP {%) 14.24 12.10 11.27 11.87 
Balance of payment 
(Millions of U.S. $) 
-1088.9 -11:36.5 -1036.1 -689.9 
Foreign exchange rate 4.717 6.311 7.5 7.5 
SOURCE; World Tables, published for the World Bank by John Hopkins 
University Press; Baltimore, 1976« 
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5. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
Following are the main conclusions of this long chapter: 
(i) The demand and supply of weapons are mainly influenced "by 
political considerations although there are some economic factors also 
attached, 
(ii) Gross Domestic Product and Gross National Product per capita 
are not necessarily affected by defense spendings, 
(iii) Defense budget is at the expense of other sectors in the 
economy. 
(iv) The underdeveloped countries have not been significantly affected 
by the domestic anas industry. 
(v) War inflicts heavy damage to the economy. 
CHAPTER IV 
EPILOGUE 
This chapter will basically be the summary of all the past chapters. 
It will restate the development of the previous chapters amd will show 
succinctly the more important findings and conclusions of the study. 
References will also be made to the questions left unanswered which will 
require research beyond the limits of this thesis. 
The thesis opens with the statement of the problem of arms spending in 
underdeveloped countries. It is a disturbing thought that in the midst of 
the pressing needs of economic development, these countries have found it 
necessary to increase their military spending so speedily, According to a V 
report of the United Nations, 
To the citizen of a developing country, with a per capita income 
of about $200 a year, even the diversion of a few dollars for 
military purposes may rob him of one of the necessities of 
life.l 
Most of these underdeveloped countries are poverty stricken with illiter¬ 
acy, drought, disease, famine and rapidly increasing population being the 
common features, These problems are protracted when the governments of 
these nations spend a larger amount possessing sophisticated weapons. The 
economy slides to the brink of disaster when these weapons are used. War 
crippled the economy of countries like India, Pakistan, Sangla Desh and most 
of the Middle Eastern countries. 
United Nations, Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and 
its Extremely Harmful Effects on World Peace and Security, 0ctober, 197*1, 
par, 32, 
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There are innumerable studies in progress on the problems of defense 
spending and its consequences on the economy of developed nations but little 
literature is available on the impact on the developing nations. 
In a long list of economists since Adam Smith, we find very few who 
wrote on this topic at length. The research work on the war business and 
its economic impact, actually started after the second great war. 
Adam Smith in his five volume book, An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations, devotes only thirty-five pages to the 
problem of defense expenditures. He considers that a permanent standing 
army is necessary. The size and type of force depends upon the needs of 
the society. All the expenditures necessary for such a force should be 
met by those who are living above subsistence wages. 
David Ricardo restricted himself to studying the implications of war on, 
the agriculture sector and International trade, His famous theory of rent 
was the outcome of studying the effects of war on agriculture. War shifts 
the resources from one sector to another. Due to food shortages, poor 
quality lands are brought into cultivation, thus raising the prices of 
fertile lands. Ricardo believed that war should be financed by taxing the 
present population. Loans and war debts should be avoided since they shift 
the burden to the future. 
According to Robert. Kalthus, war is an alternative to moral checks on 
population. When moral persuasions fail -the inevitable law of nature is 
imposed in the form of disease, famine or war. War brings prosperity to the 
economy, but it is very short-lived and illusive. 
F. W. Hirst was probably the first economist who wrote about military 
expenditure at length. He attacked vehemently spending on war. To him tills 
spending affects all sectors of the economy. On the one hand they extract 
revenue and on the other they affect the trade and finance pattern of the 
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economy. 
Lord Keynes lived in an era when two great wars were fought. He showed 
that war creates unemployment and shortages which shift the aggregate demand 
curve to the left. The whole economy sinks to a low ebb. To pull the 
economy out of this ebb an increase in aggregate demand is necessary. He 
emphasizes public expenditure at this point. Public expenditure will bring 
the aggregate demand curve to the right, end shortages, reduce unemployment, 
and will bring the economy to work at a full employment level. 
Emile Benoit did a detailed study on the impact of defense spending in 
underdeveloped countries. Through his statistical test he found that there 
was a positive correlation between the growth rates and defense spending 
in the underdeveloped countries. The adverse effect released by defense 
spending were very insignificant, being of set by many other growth stimulants. 
Seymour Melman, another anti-war spending economist, attacks military 
spending strongly. He has confined his research mainly to the economy of 
the United States, According to him the permanent war economy has effected 
the American economy to an inordinate extent. The military industrial base 
5s a parasite which flourishes at the expense of other productive activities. 
It maximizes cost, extracts skilled manpower from the civilian sector and 
brings inefficiency to the industrial sector. Eefense activities add to the 
gross national product wealth that has no utility. 
There are many economists who looked at the positive side of war. 
Sombart believed that defense activities boose industrial activities. 
Sternbuxg showed hew the research and development projects in the defense 
sector provide infrastructure for development in the civilian sector. To 
Michael Kidrcn defense spending is necessary to evert -Use threats of over 
production 
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The majority of economists hold that defense expenditure is a burden. 
If that is so then why do the poor countries bear this txirden? In other 
words, what are the factors that influence the demand or supply of weapons. 
The demand for weapons is influenced by the followings 
(1) Military need - To protect the external border from 
invasions, and to meet internal insurgency the military is 
provided with weapons. 
(2) The presence of an attitude of nationalism in underdeveloped 
countries also influences the demand for weapons, 
(3) The growing influence of armed forces also leads to massive 
acquisition of weapons. 
(4) Supplier's interest is the most important factor influencing 
the demand. Strategically important areas aie inundated with 
a large quantity of weapons at a cheap price. 
(5) Countries with vast financial resources are the heavy spenders 
on the tools of holocaust. 
The supply of weapons is influenced by the following factors: 
(1) The greed for world hegemony. 
(2) Suppliers whose domestic demand is very small but whose 
defense industry is very advanced. These countries supply 
weapons to any country without discrimination. 
(3) Supply is low from countries which adhere to a restrictive 
policy. 
There are various hypotheses regarding the impact of defense spending 
in underdeveloped countries. Defense spending affects various sectors of 
the economy. In this thesis four important beliefs have been elaborated 
and tested, First, the effect of defense spending on gross national 
product and per capita income is tested. Military spending produces goods 
which do not have any economic usefulness. It does add to GNP but the added 
wealth consists of non-productive goods„ Second, if a larger portion of a 
country's budget is spent on military goods then it becomes difficult for 
the government to allocate efficiently in other services such as health, 
education, and welfares. Third, when money is spent on manufacturing 
60 
military goods and services it necessarily diverts the resources from 
manufacturing of civilian goods. This is the opportunity cost of production 
of arms. Finally, the belief that war is detrimental to any type of economy 
is put forth. 
On testing -these hypotheses it appeared that the gross national product 
and per capita income were not affected. It was found that two different 
countries with the same percentage of allocation on defense had a different 
growth rate in GNP and had a different per capita income. This hypothesis 
was thus rejected. 
The second hypothesis was that defense expenditures in the underdeveloped 
countries is at the expense of other services. In many countries there is a 
lack of the basic necessities of life. For example, in Pakistan, with as 
much as eighty percent of the population illiterate, an absence of proper 
medical facilities and its inadequate system of transfer payment, it is 
disgusting tc see the government spending on the average thirty-two percent 
on health and education combined, 
The third hypothesis was rejected since it was found that the military 
sector was supplementing the manufacturing sector and not supplanting it. 
Moreover, the labor force in indigenous production was very insignificant. 
The final hypothesis was accepted. It was found that winning or losing 
in war did not matter and it imposes large financial cost. Three countries 
were taken into consideration. They were Israel, Egypt, and Pakistan. 
Unavailability of data made the study of other war affected economies 
impossible. 
This study was a small effort which left many questions unanswered. It 
could not answer questions about the sise of defense spending, How the 
economic and political Life of a community is affected by the rise of a 
military class was ignored. The question of disarmament was also left 
6l 
unanswered. The study also lacked many technicalities which are necessary 
to study the topic abstrusely. It is however hoped that this study is a 
contribution, though insignificantly, to studying the topic in detail. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Books 
Benoit, Emile. Defense and Economics Growth in Developing Countries. 
Lexington: D. G. Heath and Company, 1973# 
Brown, William A.; and Opie, Red vers. American Foreign Assistance. 
Washington, D.G,s The Brookings Institute, 1953# 
CBS News Almanace., 1977 ed,, S.v. ‘'Pakistan". 
Clark, John. New Economics of National Defense, New York: Random House, 
1966. 
A Dictionary of Economics, .19 ed,, S.v. "Cost", S, v. "Malthus, Robert 
Thomas". 
Kennedy, Gavin, The Economics of Defense. London: Faber and Faber, 1975. 
Kennedy, Gavin. The Military in the Third World. London: Duckworth 
Publishers, 1974.' 
Kidron, Michael. Western Capitalism Since the War. London: Peter Smith 
Publisher, Inc,, 1970. 
Lekachman, Robert. The Age of Keynes. New York: McGraw Hill, 1975• 
Melman, Seymour. The Permanent War Economy. New Yorks Simon and Schuster, 
1974. 
Smitli, Adam. An Inquiry into the Nature and the Causes of Wealth of Nations, 
New York: Random House Inc,, 1937. 
Sternberg, Fritz. The Military and Industrial Revolution of Our Times, New 
York: Fredrick A, Praeger, 1959. 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRl), The- Arms Trade 
with the Third World. New York: Humanities Press, 1971. 
Thayer, George, The War Business. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969. 
U, S, Department of State, The Chances for Peace, An address reorinted, 
April 27, 1933. 
.BIBLIOGRAPHY CONTINUED 
Articles 
Hoagland, J.j and Teeple, J. "Economics of Regional Arms Race," 
Disarmament and World Economic Interdependence, 1967, New York» 
Columbia University Press, 
Mayer, Alan J.} and others. "Anatomy of the Arms Trade," Newsweek 
(Septejfiber 6, 1976), pp, 39-^5. 
Statistical Materials 
Dupuy, T. N.j and Blanchard, W, "Almanace of World Military Power," 
New Yorki R. R, Bowden and Company, 1972, 
United Nations, Statistical Yearbook 1965 New Yorki Publishing Service 
United Nations, 1965. 
, Statistical Yearbook 1970 New York* Publishing Service 
United Nations, 1970, 
, Statistical Yearbook 1972 New York* Publishing Service 
United Nations, 1972, 
, Statistical Yearbook 1975 New York* Publishing Service 
United Nations, 1975» 
U, S, Statistical Office, Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics. 1970 
New York* International Publishing Service, 1970, 
 , Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1971 
New York* International Publishing Service, 1971. 
 . Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1972 
New York* International Publishing Service, 1972, 
 , Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics. 1973 
New York* International Publishing Service, 1973. 
 , Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics. 197^ 
New York* International Publishing Service, 197^. 
World Bank, World Tables, 1976, Baltimore* John Hopkins University Press, 
1976. 
